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Excessive State Debt: A New Approach to a Growing Problem
Summary
Economists and political observers agree state governments defaulting on their debt obligations is a growing
concern. How best to aid struggling states, however, is a point of contention. This Issue Brief makes a case
against ex post restructuring measures, specifically bankruptcy modeled on Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, and in favor of ex ante debt mitigation action. In particular, it introduces tax-credit borrowing (TCB) as
a potential commitment device for states that would allow for the creation of super-priority, risk-free debt.
TCB ensures that states internalize the risk of default and avoids the moral hazard problem of states assuming
that the federal government will, in a fiscal crisis, use taxpayer money to offer a bailout. It also incentivizes
better monitoring of the borrowing decisions made by state officials, as the fiscal ramifications of excessive
debt would move from state creditors to taxpayers and voters. Small changes to federal tax policy and likely a
subsidy (relative to traditional debt) would be necessary to encourage tax-credit borrowing, but this new
approach can solve the sticky problem of debt prioritization that continues to mystify states and
municipalities.
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Excessive State Debt: A New 
Approach to a Growing Problem
Vincent S.J. Buccola, JD
Since the beginning of the Great Recession and for the first time since the 1890’s, 
many academic and political commentators have begun to voice serious concerns 
about the possibility of state governments defaulting on their debt obligations.
Several of the most fiscally troubled states in the coun-
try, specifically California, Illinois, and New Jersey, 
have struggled with and continue to face eroded tax 
bases and higher levels of spending on countercyclical 
welfare programs. With less revenue at their disposal, 
many states now massively underfund their pension 
obligations and borrow at excessive rates,1 all of which 
has led credit rating agencies to downgrade these 
states’ general-obligation ratings on a regular basis (see 
Figure 1). 
A frequent refrain from commentators is the 
proposal to aid states by allowing them to restructure 
or even eliminate some of their debt through a formal, 
federal bankruptcy process modeled on Chapter 9 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. The rationale, quite simply, is 
that bankruptcy is preferable to a bailout, as a federal 
bailout would explicitly institutionalize the moral haz-
ard of over-borrowing at the state level, which state 
administrators may already assume exists implicitly.  
In essence, if states are “too big to fail,” as many argue, 
then the federal government will have to intervene 
and redirect revenues from non-failing states to 
prevent a state’s default. With the threat of contagion 
SUMMARY
• With good reason, economists and political observers have 
begun to voice serious concerns about the possibility of state 
governments defaulting on their debt obligations. How best to 
aid struggling states, however, is a point of contention.
• This Issue Brief makes a case against ex post restructuring 
measures, specifically bankruptcy modeled on Chapter 9 of the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and in favor of ex ante debt mitigation 
action. In particular, it introduces tax-credit borrowing (TCB) 
as a potential commitment device for states that would allow 
for the creation of super-priority, risk-free debt. 
• TCB ensures that states internalize the risk of default and 
avoids the moral hazard problem of states assuming that 
the federal government will, in a fiscal crisis, use taxpayer 
money to offer a bailout. It also incentivizes better monitor-
ing of the borrowing decisions made by state officials, as the 
fiscal ramifications of excessive debt would move from state 
creditors to taxpayers and voters. 
• Small changes to federal tax policy and likely a subsidy (rela-
tive to traditional debt) would be necessary to encourage 
tax-credit borrowing, but this new approach can solve the 
sticky problem of debt prioritization that continues to mystify 
states and municipalities.
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and spillover effects to other states, 
bailouts are unavoidable absent an 
alternative path forward. Therefore,  
so the thinking goes, bankruptcy at 
the state level must be made avail-
able. But academics and politicians 
alike have had mixed reactions to this 
proposal, and for good reasons. One 
in particular is that it ignores the less 
than obvious reality that states would 
never willingly concede to undergo 
formal bankruptcy proceedings, even 
if they were forced to default on their 
debt obligations.
States already have the power 
to alter their debts unilaterally by 
extending the maturities of their 
bonds or by reducing the principal 
or interest rates they choose to repay. 
The constitutionality of these actions 
actually does not matter because 
states are protected by the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity. Lenders have 
no legal recourse in the event of a 
default on state debt or even in the 
case of (arguably illegal) unilateral 
debt re-composition. Additionally, 
states can take advantage of de facto 
Chapter 9 protections right now, but 
none choose to do so.2 In a bank-
ruptcy, states would have to relinquish 
their power to externalize risk (i.e., 
redirect risk to other states), but being 
contagious is valuable for states—as 
noted above, it underlies the notion 
that they are too big to fail. Regard-
less, no entity, not even the federal 
government, can require a state to 
avail itself of that recourse, especially 
given its potential uselessness, which 
stems from Chapter 9’s insolvency 
requirement. The bankruptcy approach 
could very likely be too little, too 
late. Ultimately, any solution to curb 
excessive state borrowing must be ex 
ante, as states would never consent to 
ex post federal restructuring measures. 
The problem necessarily requires pre-
default mitigation. This Issue Brief 
presents such an approach in the form 
of “tax-credit borrowing.”3 
TAX OFFSETS IN LIEU OF 
CASH OUTLAYS
Tax-credit borrowing (TCB) is a 
financing mechanism (similar to but 
in place of traditional forms of state 
debt) that can act as a commitment 
device for a state, ensuring that it 
 1  A useful definition of excessive debt is debt that results in 
socially wasteful spending—projects that the polity, how-
ever defined, values at less than cost.
 2  A state could leverage the Bankruptcy Code’s generous 
definition of “municipality,” and create a municipality whose 
sole purpose would be to issue all debt for the entire 
state. It would issue general-obligation bonds, back state 
employees’ pension rights, and reimburse trade creditors. 
This entity would not be the state itself, but rather its sole 
financing arm, funded through appropriations. As such, this 
new municipality could declare bankruptcy, even though the 
state itself is ineligible for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 9. 
 3  This Issue Brief is based principally on: Vincent S.J. Buc-
cola (2014), “An Ex Ante Approach to Excessive State Debt,” 
Duke Law Journal, Vol. 64: 235.
 4  This is mathematically true, but the relevant players in the 
markets and at the polls may not see this the same way. For 
a divergent opinion, see David Gamage and Darien Shanske 
(2011), “Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and 
Political Salience,” 65 Tax L. Rev. 19.
 5  A 2012 study by Anna Gelpern published under the title 
“Bankruptcy Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign 
Debt” in the Yale Law Journal reveals that 40 of the 50 
states bar money-damages suits in their own courts, and 
no state consents to damages actions in federal court. Of 
the 10 states that do allow money-damages actions, the 
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FIGURE 1 RATIO OF LONG-TERM DEBT OBLIGATIONS TO STATE INCOME
Note: The four largest states (by population) among the lowest ranking states in the Mercatus Center’s 2016 “Ranking of States by Fiscal 
Condition” report all have extremely high ratios of long-term obligations to state income. These four states alone represent 21% of the total 
U.S. population.
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meets all of its debt obligations as 
originally composed. Through the 
issuance of tax-credit bonds, TCB 
circumvents the protections offered to 
a state by sovereign immunity, and it 
internalizes financial risk, which likely 
would lead to a reduction in borrow-
ing overall. 
The concept can be explained in 
this way. If a state were to no longer 
repay its creditors with cash outlays 
from its revenue (according to terms 
it could unilaterally alter), but instead 
creditors were compensated for the 
capital they lent to a state by lower-
ing their tax burdens through tax 
credits linked to these new tax-credit 
bonds, any attempt by a state to collect 
that revenue would force the state to 
assume the role of plaintiff in court. 
This circumvents the sovereign immu-
nity doctrine, which treats states as 
unassailable defendants but does not 
substantively privilege them as plain-
tiffs. TCB would give the creditors 
who invest in tax-credit bonds the legal 
recourse to be made whole, especially 
in times of extreme fiscal hardship for 
states, without actually requiring the 
intervention of courts. Creditors would 
merely offset their taxes by the amount 
a state owed them. 
Logistically, an extra dollar 
payable by a state is the same as an 
uncollected dollar receivable within 
the same reporting window.4 There-
fore, the difference in this approach is 
not financial but legal, as TCB would 
require a state, rather than the credi-
tors, to invoke judicial process. If a 
state were to pursue collective action, 
the U.S. Constitution’s Contract 
Clause would defend the tax-under-
payment actions of creditors. As a 
result, TCB would enable the creation 
of super-priority, risk-free debt. Here 
is why.
FISCAL POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS
Despite the recent experiences of the 
Detroit bankruptcy and the sovereign 
debt defaults in Puerto Rico, practi-
tioners in the sphere of public finance 
still cannot solve the problem of how 
a state or territory can credibly issue 
debt that is arranged by priority of 
payment obligation. Distinguishing 
debt on a seniority or secured basis 
is ubiquitous in the private sector, 
but sovereign immunity at the state 
level (i.e., no judicial remedy) negates 
all attempts at structuring state debt 
portfolios with such distinctions. In 
turn, if another default were to occur, 
it is not clear when (if ever) and 
which (if any) lenders, vendors, or 
employees would be compensated. The 
lack of prioritization makes debt more 
expensive because lenders demand a 
premium for accepting higher levels 
of financial risk, which stems from the 
political risk of default and a subse-
quent rejection of judicial remedy.5 
But without the obstacle of sovereign 
immunity, and with minimal changes 
to federal tax policy, tax-credit bor-
rowing becomes a risk-free alternative 
to traditional debt. 
With TCB, states assume the 
financial risk of all their borrowing 
decisions. This not only protects lend-
ers and reduces borrowing costs, but it 
is also a better cure than bankruptcy 
for the aforementioned moral hazard 
problem (real or perceived), and it 
could mitigate the political agency 
problem many commentators believe 
to be a cause of excessive state debt.
Beginning with the moral hazard 
problem, it is plausible that the exces-
sive over-borrowing by states is the 
result of state administrators assuming 
that their respective states are too big 
to fail. If this theory is true, as state 
bankruptcy proponents contend, states 
are effectively externalizing some of 
the risk of default—at least on the 
margins and to a degree that affects 
state policy—and placing a burden on 
the federal government (i.e., taxpayers 
legislatures in each state remain free to strip their courts of 
jurisdiction in anticipation of a default.
 6  See notes 3 and 25 in Buccola (2014).
 7  Because tax-credit bonds can lower a state tax bill, an 
individual would end up paying higher federal income taxes, 
since municipal income and state taxes are eligible federal 
income tax deductions. For TCB to be viable, the Tax Code 
would need to allow for adjustments to federal taxes for the 
theoretical taxes a tax-credit bondholder would not have 
paid had they simply owned traditional state debt. This can 
be accomplished through a new IRS regulation and does not 
require Congressional approval.
 8  Meanwhile, outstanding publicly traded debt issued by 
states is approximately only $1 trillion. Source: Robert Novy-
Marx and Joshua Rauh (2011), “Public Pension Promises: 
How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?”, 66 J. Fin., 
pp. 1211-1213.
NOTES 
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from other states). In this case, TCB 
by its nature would ensure that states 
internalize this risk, as discretion 
over whether or not to take advan-
tage of tax credits linked to tax-credit 
bonds is completely up to creditors. 
The possibility of default disappears 
entirely, although the potential for 
fiscal distress remains. But it is simply 
the case that there is no empirical 
consensus that risk-externalization is 
the sole or even the primary cause of 
excessive borrowing.6 A more general 
question, therefore, may be of greater 
interest: what might TCB look like 
in a world where states are inclined 
to over-borrow? This is not explicitly 
a question about risk. There are many 
competing theories about state bor-
rowing practices, and many stem from 
the standard agency problem. 
The agency problem in this 
instance posits that politicians over-
borrow because they are not effectively 
monitored. Voters tend to reward 
near-term spending and tax-relief 
initiatives at the expense of future sol-
vency. Those who will be most affected 
by a state’s long-term financial pros-
pects often do a poor job of reigning 
in borrowing. In short, over-borrow-
ing is a problem of political dysfunc-
tion. TCB would work by shifting the 
monitoring incentive to voters because 
it first shifts the responsibility for the 
financial risk associated with state 
debt from the state’s creditors to its 
taxpayers and residents. This should 
lead to lower levels of borrowing. 
But it begs the question of whether 
such a shift is normatively preferable. 
The answer: it depends. It depends 
on, among other things, the expected 
effects from the shift on state financial 
decisions, including states’ borrowing, 
taxing, and spending policies. 
If the concern truly is one of 
misaligned political incentives, TCB 
could help to correct the current 
monitoring deficiencies. As it is, the 
current monitors of political agents—
the creditors—only care about risk-
adjusted returns, so the point at which 
they will simply stop lending is not 
likely related to optimal fiscal policy. 
OBJECTIONS TO TAX-CREDIT 
BORROWING
1. FEDERAL TAX POLICY
It can reasonably be asked why, if 
states will not accept ex post bank-
ruptcy for the reasons outlined above, 
they would begin issuing tax-credit 
bonds ex ante. There are two possible 
motivations: political altruism and/or 
a federal subsidy. Regarding altru-
ism, many state administrators likely 
would prefer to make responsible 
borrowing decisions to protect against 
future fiscal troubles, so TCB appears 
a rational course of action. But when 
a crisis hits, officials begin to make 
rash, compromised decisions, as this is 
when lobbying efforts from a variety 
of competing interest groups are the 
most concentrated. But for those who 
don’t subscribe to this rosy view, the 
adoption of TCB would require a 
carrot. At a minimum, the Tax Code 
would need to be amended to undo 
what is, in effect, a relative subsidy 
of traditional bond borrowing (i.e., 
the income tax exemption for inter-
est on state and municipal bonds). 
Proponents of TCB would need a 
corresponding provision that excludes 
from taxation the interest “income” 
provided by a tax-credit bond in the 
form of a reduced tax liability.7 With 
such a provision, TCB is much more 
attractive than bankruptcy, given its 
ability to reduce borrowing costs. 
Whether there is any uptake 
of TCB absent the threat of finan-
cial distress probably depends on 
two things. The first is consolidated 
interest groups wielding their col-
lective political influence to spur the 
adoption of tax-credit bonds in the 
marketplace. The example of state 
pensioners is explored below. 
The second is recognition that 
parity with traditional debt is likely 
not enough for TCB to gain traction. 
State administrators may require an 
incentive, such as a relative subsidy of 
TCB, for forgoing their natural inter-
est in risk-externalization. Quantify-
ing the size of a TCB subsidy would 
require experimentation, but inves-
tors would be able to self-sort in the 
marketplace and would home in on 
an acceptable subsidy amount in short 
order. But even if states adopt the use 
of tax-credit bonds, there is another 
concern once these instruments are in 
the marketplace.
2. SECONDARY MARKET LIQUIDITY
It is also appropriate to ask whether 
the scope of TCB could ever be wide 
enough to have a meaningful impact 
on a state’s political economy. Do 
investors have a sufficient appetite for 
tax-credit bonds? A robust second-
ary market is critical to support large 
issuances of tax-credit bonds. For 
traditional municipal and state bonds, 
the secondary market is highly liquid 
and efficient. But tax-credit bonds 
have intrinsic value only to the extent 
that market participants expect to owe 
taxes to the issuing state. This liquid-
ity concern is more pronounced for 
smaller, less populous states.
One response to this concern 
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is simply convertibility. If tax-credit 
bonds were issued as traditional debt 
but with an additional option to con-
vert, then the liquidity problem would 
be solved. A convertible tax-credit 
bond would trade at a discount relative 
to a traditional bond, particularly when 
issued by a smaller state or in times of 
distress, but the difference would be 
negligible for solvent and “trustworthy” 
states. A different but complementary 
response would be to allow smaller 
states to form an interstate compact to 
develop a national secondary market—
a reciprocity agreement that would be 
enforceable in federal court.
TCB AND PENSIONS: A 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION
Tax-credit borrowing has a history, 
albeit limited, in the United States. In 
1997, Congress authorized state and 
local governments to issue “qualified 
zone academy bonds,” or QZABs. 
These QZABs granted lenders tax 
offsets in exchange for the use of 
their capital, which was designated to 
support specific infrastructure devel-
opment projects. Passing over the 
irrelevant details, the takeaway is that 
tax-credit bonds were issued to fund 
preferred state and local activities. 
There is reason to believe that TCB 
can work again and on a grander scale 
as a means of creating risk-free debt. 
And one way to introduce tax-credit 
bonds into the marketplace could be 
by earmarking the borrowed capital for 
the support of a vulnerable group. 
One obvious example of a 
worthwhile interest to protect, in 
the state context, is pension holders. 
Assumptions vary widely, but pension 
shortfalls alone account for between 
roughly one and three trillion dollars 
of debt (see Figure 2).8 TCB could 
work to close that gap. As a form of 
risk-free, prioritized debt, tax-credit 
bonds would be cheaper to issue, and 
assuming the concerns raised in the 
previous section are addressed, pen-
sioners themselves would benefit from 
knowing that their retirement savings 
are better protected against default. As 
a concentrated lobby and voting bloc, 
they could wield significant influence 
over politicians and encourage the 
adoption of TCB as a mechanism for 
raising future capital to rebuild state 
pension trust funds. 
Even if TCB only comprises 
a small piece of a state’s total debt 
portfolio, it could still serve a use-
ful purpose. One of its appealing 
attributes is that it allows creditors to 
sort themselves through trade. Lend-
ers who believe themselves relatively 
powerless politically or who have 
lower risk tolerance levels (e.g., pen-
sion funds) would be inclined to buy 
tax-credit bonds. On the other hand, 
lenders with great political influence or 
who have higher risk tolerance levels 
(e.g., large municipal investors) would 
prefer traditional debt. TCB need not 
be wholesale, and the protection of 
specific, vulnerable people or classes 
may be a good entry point for this new 
approach to the problem of excessive 
state debt.
CONCLUSION
In the last few years, the perilous 
financial conditions of many Ameri-
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FIGURE 2 MARKET VALUE OF UNFUNDED PENSION LIABILITY ($ BILLIONS)
Note: These four states alone account for 31% of all unfunded pension liability in the country. From the Mercatus Center’s 2016 “Ranking of 
States by Fiscal Condition” report.
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can states have come into clearer 
focus. Recent cases of fiscal distress in 
places like Detroit and Puerto Rico 
have led many academics and politi-
cians to consider options for debt 
relief should an imminent threat of 
default emerge at the state level. This 
Issue Brief makes a case against ex 
post restructuring measures, specifi-
cally bankruptcy modeled on Chapter 
9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and 
in favor of ex ante debt mitigation 
action. In particular, it introduces 
tax-credit borrowing as a potential 
commitment device for states that 
would allow for the creation of super-
priority, risk-free debt. Tax-credit 
borrowing precludes the opportunity 
of default by reversing the plaintiff/
defendant distinction that protects 
states under the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity. With super-priority, 
risk free debt, there would be better 
monitoring of the borrowing decisions 
made by state officials, as the fiscal 
ramifications of excessive debt moves 
from state creditors to taxpayers and 
voters. Small changes to federal tax 
policy and likely a subsidy (relative  
to traditional debt) would be neces-
sary to encourage tax-credit borrow-
ing, but this new approach can solve 
the sticky problem of debt prioritiza-
tion that continues to mystify states 
and municipalities.
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